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In common law days, the law evolved gradually on a case by case basis
as courts applied the general principles to new and different fact situa-
tions. Each adjudication was merely a step in the process by which the
judges made the law. The guiding principle was that like cases should
be given like treatment. Earlier cases, precedents, were consulted to
produce a semblance of consistency as a changing environment caused
the law to change and grow.
The twentieth century, particularly since the New Deal, has seen
the "'statutorification' of American law" 1 as legislatures responded to
rapid social and technological changes by an "orgy of statute mak-
ing". 2 Consequently, courts have been forced to learn a new role, that
of primarily applying the law given to them rather than creating it.
Judges have not always taken this demotion gracefully, especially when
the legislation before them is less than perfect. When the statute under
consideration is obsolete, the loss of the common law power to change
the law is particularly frustrating.
Inertia tends to insulate even an obsolete statute from repeal. Not
until a sufficiently powerful group has been offended will there be a
change. The legislature may not even realize that a statute is out of
date until there is some public uproar about its application. Guido Cal-
abresi, the Sterling Professor at Yale Law School, proposes in A Com-
mon Law for the Age of Statutes that it is appropriate in the course of
adjudicating disputes, for courts to discover which statutes are no
longer consistent with the current legal topography. Judges have the
training and experience necessary for this task, and the judicial process
is particularly likely to reveal any anachronism in the law. Moteover,
* Professor of Law, Nova University Law Center. B.S.M.E. 1970, Northeastern
University; J.D. 1973, University of Connecticut; LL.M. 1976 Temple University.
1. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
2. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977), quoted in G. CALA-
BRESI, supra note 1, at 1.
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courts are already engaged in this discovery mission.
More importantly, Professor Calabresi points out, courts often re-
fuse to stop at discovery of anachronisms but rather proceed to employ
a number of techniques for dealing with obsolete statutes. A court may
overreact by finding the statute in question to be constitutionally infirm
due only to its obsolescence, or may strain to interpret the statute to
eliminate the flaw or to magnify the flaw so as to coerce some legisla-
tive reaction. The court might, alternatively, refuse to enforce the stat-
ute on the basis of desuetude, vagueness, or invalid delegation. But
each of these techniques is a subterfuge for what the court is actually
doing and each involves dangers to our political system.
The greatest danger is that all are inherently dishonest. In each
technique the court claims to be making its decision on a ground other
than the true one-the obsolescence of the statute. The result may be
incomprehensible to the electorate. Worse, if the subterfuge is detected,
it could deprive the court of its credibility.
If the obsolete law had evolved from cases in the traditional com-
mon law fashion, the court could react to the obsolescence by changing
the law openly and directly. Faced with an out-of-date statute rather
than out-of-date case law, the court encounters a dilemma. The legal
literature reveals no doctrine which would justify judicial modification
of a statute and, therefore, such judicial action lacks all legitimacy.
Professor Calabresi proposes considering a doctrine which would
allow courts to deal with the archaic statute candidly. His proposal
would allow the court, after finding the statute no longer fits into the
current legal framework, to allocate the burden of the next step accord-
ing to the appropriate competence of the legislature, judiciary or even
an administrative agency. The court would be allowed to alter, nullify,
or even enforce the statute subject to a specific statement that a legisla-
tive reconsideration resulting in a revision, repeal or reaffirmation is
necessary.$ This procedure would have the benefit of providing the
3. Legislative reaffirmation of a statute becomes possible if the court has ex-
pressed its opinion that the statute is defective solely because it no longer fits the legal
topography. The legislature may respond that it is still supported by a majority and is
therefore valid. If the court had used a subterfuge such as unconstitutionality, such a
direct and simple response from the legislature would be impossible. What would be
required would be either a reworking of the statute to squeeze within constitutional
limits or a constitutional amendment.
2
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court with a legitimate course of action. It would also increase the flex-
ibility with which a legislature could subsequently deal with the obso-
lete statute.4
Calabresi denies advocating the adoption of this novel doctrine; he,
claims to be merely presenting it as a possible alternative to the present
situation because it would allow courts to continue substantially on
their present course, but without deception. The latter aspect might in-
crease the credibility of the courts, garnering majoritarian support.
However, he implies that it is really the only viable alternative because
our system lacks an effective mechanism to stop the courts from nulli-
fying or modifying statutes by subterfuge. The present dishonest ap-
proach will end only if courts are offered a more attractive method of
eliminating out-of-date statutes.
Unfortunately, Professor Calabresi fails to address another hy-
pothesis which might better explain the present system. The judicial
reaction to statutes might not be a result of the fact that judges are
better trained and in a better position to discover the outdated statute,
but rather that as a result of their education and professional socializa-
tion, judges are convinced that the final word on what is the law should
lie with them.6 Judges, aware that nonlawyers may not share this be-
4. If the court were to determine that a statute is invalid due to vagueness, the
legislature in enacting a replacement would have to avoid the "vague" language. Like-
wise, if the court were to find a statute constitutionally defective, any subsequent stat-
ute must avoid a similar defect. If the actual basis for the judgment was that the
statute was obsolete rather than vague or unconstitutional, the legislature in reacting
must not only produce a modern statute but must also avoid the "vague" language or
constitutional defect.
5. This hypothesis is based upon the theory that the electorate would respond
affirmatively to a court decision which was based upon an easily understood concept,
obsolescence, rather than on esoteric legal doctrine and also would responds affirma-
tively to court decisions which did not preclude in absolutist terms any response by the
electorate through the legislature.
6. The education at Harvard Law School at the time Felix Frankfurter entered
in 1902 is described as follows: "Langdell's innovations [the case method] reinforced
the conservative legal values that dominated the training of most students, who learned
the superiority of judge-made common law over legislation. . . ." M. PARRISH, FELIX
FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 18 (1982). Moreover, one of the
most influential of Frankfurter's professors, John Gray, pointed out explicitly that "[A]
judge might be swayed by precedent, expert opinion, custom, moral principles, or legis-
lative statutes, "but in truth all the Law is judge-made law." M. PARRISH, id. at 20
1 7:1983
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lief,7 avoid a confrontation with the legislature and the electorate by
utilizing subterfuge to reclaim the lost common law power. Adoption of
the proposed doctrine would simply legitimate the judiciary's return to
primacy by its own edict.8 Such a bold grasp of power may eliminate
(quoting in part from M. COHEN & E. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY] 407-15 (1951).
The same bias in legal education still exists. See generally E. GEE & D. JACKSON,
FOLLOWING THE LEADER? THE UNEXPLAINED CONCENSUS IN LAW SCHOOL CURRIC-
ULA (1975); 0. Lewis, Curricula Study (1982) (unpublished manuscript); J. SELIG-
MAN, THE HIGH CITADEL: THE INFLUENCE OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1978). See
also Brown, The U.C.C. (Sales) as an Introductory Law School Course, 30 J. OF LE-
GAL EDUC. 592 (1980) arguing that at least one statutory course, such as Sales, should
be taught in first year of law school based upon the experience that law students, fol-
lowing a typical first year of common law subjects, strongly resist utilizing even clearly
applicable statutes rather than the common law.
7. In 1848 Alexis de Tocqueville criticized American Law because: "Our written
laws [the French Civil Law Code] are often hard to understand, but everyone can read
them, whereas nothing could be more obscure and out of reach of the common man
than a law founded on precedent." A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 267
(J.P. Mayer ed. 1969).
It may be hypothesized that one impetus for the "statutorification" of the twenti-
eth century was the electorate's desire for understandable laws. The shift of lawmaking
power from the judiciary to the legislature would appear to be a first step in accom-
plishing that majoritarian desire.
The electorate believes that courts are bound to enforce statutes which are consti-
tutional. Only if there is no statute can judges make their own law. This may be illus-
trated by an excerpt from a popular college text: "What happens if there is no statu-
tory law governing a case that comes before a court? What if the legislature has not
formalized any rule to apply to the dispute? Then the judge must apply the common
law. Common law is judge-made law." J. BURNS & J. W. PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY
THE PEOPLE 514 (1966) (emphasis added).
The currentness of this belief was recently evidenced in the Senate confirmation
hearings of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor. Clinton, Judges Must Make Law: A Realis-
tic Appraisal of the Judicial Function in a Democratic Society, 67 IOWA L. REV. 711
(1982).
8. de Toqueville pointed out the special status enjoyed by judges and lawyers in
the early 19th century: "If you ask me where the American Aristocracy is found, I
have no hesitation in answering. . . . It is at the bar or the bench that the American
aristocracy is found." DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 268.
Few would argue that judges enjoy such elevated status today. See, e.g.,
Yankelovich, Skelley & White, Highlights of a National Survey of the General Public,
Judges, Lawyers, and Community Leaders in State Courts: A Blueprint for the Future 5
(proceedings of the Second National Conference on the Judiciary held in Williams-
4
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the very marjoritarian support which Professor Calabresi hopes it will
garner.
If the power to make, revise and repeal statutes properly belongs
to the legislature alone, then the judicial behavior which Professor Cal-
abresi has described is improper and the discussion should focus on the
formation of an effective mechanism to curb such behavior in the fu-
ture. Only if the courts are legitimately exercising revision and repeal
powers do we need a doctrine to explain the proper limits of that activ-
ity. A Common Law for the Age of Statutes makes fascinating reading
but shifting the discussion to statutory obsolescence and the effect of
inertia in statutory revision seems uncomfortably like a subterfuge to
avoid tackling the real issue: whether the ultimate lawmaking power
should reside with the courts or with the legislature.9
burg, Virginia, (March 19-22, 1978). See also McConnell, Why People Today Dis-
trust the Courts, 17 JUDGES' J. 12 (1978).
9. The point is illustrated by the following hypothetical conversation about a hy-
pothetical statute which prohibitied removal of another person's gall bladder.
"that law couldn't conceivably pass."
"But suppose it did."
"Come on, it wouldn't. We've got problems enough without hypothe-
sizing absurdities."
"Suppose it did."
"Okay, I'll play your game. If it passed, I think we could get it re-
pealed pretty quick."
"What if we couldn't?"
"Then I'd suppose my elected representatives had found out some-
thing about gall bladders that you and I are unaware of."
"Suppose they hadn't. Suppose they were just acting crazy."
"Vote them out. Impeach them. Repeal the law."
"Can't. Most people believe they're doing the right thing."
"And they're just acting crazy too?"
"Right."
"I don't suppose we can reason with them."
"Nope."
"You know what you're telling me? That you don't believe in
democracy. .. "
J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 182 (1980).
Ely's book, of course, focuses on the scope of judicial review for constitutional
violations while Calabresi focuses on the scope of judicial review of obsolete statutes.
Both books are, however, reactions to the same ultimate question, what is the appropri-
ate role of courts, vis a vis legislatures, in our democratic system. A subsequent ques-
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tion would be how the courts can perform their tasks without alienating the popular
support necessary for continued successful performance of these tasks.
7:19831
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